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On September 21, 2007, former New York Governor Eliot
Spitzer made national headlines when he announced a controver-
sial new driver's license program that would grant licenses to both
New York citizens as well as undocumented immigrants.' Spitzer
offered several practical, meritorious reasons for reforming New
York policy on driver's licenses, but his rationale was drowned in
the heated controversy that erupted. The focus was not only the
issue of immigration but also anger at Spitzer's unilateral use of
executive power to push through the policy without consulting the
New York legislature or the general public. The negative reper-
cussions spread to the national level in immigration discussions
and presidential debates. His eventual abandonment of the plan
left division and bitterness among both supporters and critics. In
the end, Spitzer's bungling of his bold policy may have seriously
set back positive dialogue on immigration reform.
II. NEW YORK'S LICENSING REFORMS
In recent years, the New York driver's license policy under-
went a number of changes that were largely unnoticed. Prior to
1995, New York did not require proof of citizenship or a Social
Security Number (SSN) for a license application.2 In 1995, the
1 See Nina Bernstein, Spitzer Grants Illegal Immigrants Easier Access to
Driver's Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at B1; Karla Schuster, N.Y. to
AllowLicenses for All; Illegal immigrants will soon be able to drive in the state
legally, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007 at A14; Stephen Dinan, N.Y. to Allow
Illegals to Drive; Critics assail policy change, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at
Al.
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New York legislature added an amendment to the Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 502, which required each license applicant to pro-
vide his or her SSN.3 The legislature's purpose in implementing
this change was to improve the collection of child support
payments by tracking SSNs.4 Under then-Governor George Pataki,
the amendment was interpreted to allow the Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV) to approve non-citizens for licenses if they could
produce a letter from the Social Security Administration (SSA)
that showed they were not eligible for work and, therefore, could
not obtain a SSN.5 By these rules, almost 500,000 applicants
without SSN were registered at the New York DMV. 6 On Septem-
ber 6, 2001, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles reformed the
policy to require non-citizens to submit an SSA letter as well as
immigration documents as further proof of their legal residence.7
Just five days after this rule change, the world was stunned by the
9/11 attacks. Afterwards, it was discovered that the 9/11 terrorists
had successfully obtained a total of twenty-eight state-issued iden-
tification documents or driver's licenses. 8 This breach of security
led to obvious fears of the consequences of identity fraud and the
need to continue enforcing these stricter requirements. In the 2007
case of Cubas v. Martinez, the Court of Appeals upheld the
requirement of additional immigration documents for NYS driver's
license applicants as a right of the discretion of the DMV.9
' See Press Release, Governor Spitzer, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding






7 See Dan Janison, Spin Cycle, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 28, 2007, at A 18.
8 See Andrew Ward, NYgovernor drops immigrants plan, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), Nov. 15, 2007, at 15.
9 Cubas v. Martinez, 870 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 2007).
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A. Spitzer's Proposed Reform
During his 2006 gubernatorial campaign, Spitzer promised
to reform New York's immigration policy, which he felt insuffi-
ciently dealt with the estimated 500,000 to 1 million illegal immi-
grants in New York State.' 0 It seemed impossible to deport all the
illegal aliens and Spitzer claimed the federal government had
already failed several times at creating a national policy to protect
the United States borders and deal with the millions of illegal
immigrants already in the country." According to Spitzer, states
could no longer wait for the national government and had to come
up with practical and more immediate responses: "[a]s long as I am
governor, we will not pretend that they do not exist, we will not cut
them off from participating in our society, and we will not become
part of a myth that is propagated at the federal level that they are
not here."' The administration sought to address this gap in
federal action when, just nine months into his tenure, Spitzer
followed up on his campaign promise and announced New York's
new licensing plan.'
3
According to his plan, Spitzer intended to eliminate the
requirement of Social Security Numbers and federally approved
immigration documentation and instead allow foreign passports to
be used as identification for obtaining driver's licenses. 4  The
administration also indicated fourteen documents that it deemed
acceptable forms of identification, of which a combination of
'0 See NY: Faso Criticizes Spitzer For Favoring Granting Driver's Licenses To
Illegal Immigrants, THE FRONTRUNNER (N.J), Oct. 3 1, 2006; Karla Schuster
& Susana Enriquez, License to change, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 22, 2007, at A3.
'1 Schuster & Enriquez, supra note 10.
12 Id.
13 Dinan, supra note 1.
14See Press Release, supra note 2; New Mexico issues a single license to citizens
and undocumented immigrants. New Mexico also accepts as proof documents
issued by the Mexican government. See Celeste Katz, States at Crossroads for
Illegal Immigrant Driver's Licenses, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 28, 2007, at 6.
Spitzer's plan would have made New York the largest state to allow undocu-
mented immigrants to legally obtain driver's licenses. See Schuster & Enriquez,
supra note 10, at A3.
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several of these documents would be needed in order to prove
identity.' 5 In addition to these changes, Spitzer also ended the
requirement of stamps on licenses of temporary visitors that
indicated their status as well as when their visas would expire. 6
This policy meant that temporary visitors would have the license
for eight years even if only staying for several months.' 7 Spitzer
justified eliminating the requirement of SSNs by claiming that it
did not provide more secure protection to New Yorkers since any
non-citizen could obtain a SSN by proving eligibility for work. 18
In addition, the administration claimed that legal citizens of New
York suffered unduly from the accidents committed by uninsured,
illegal immigrants.19 It was assumed that illegal immigrants would
continue to drive whether they had licenses or not because they
needed to commute to their jobs.z0 By granting licenses to illegal
immigrants, it would at least allow them the opportunity to pur-
chase insurance. The Spitzer administration believed that by doing
so, traffic safety would improve and estimated that state drivers
would save approximately $120 million per year in insurance
premiums. 2 It was also estimated that the policy would generate
around $6 million in state revenue with new license fees. 22
In addition, Spitzer maintained that registration of illegal
immigrants for driver's licenses would actually improve security
by providing law enforcement with a valuable resource of names,
addresses, and photographs of those immigrants who remain
15 See Press Release, supra note 2
16 Tom Precious, Opposition Mounts on Driver's Licenses: 7 More Counties
Defy Spitzer on Providing Them to Illegal Immigrants, Hochul May Join
Lawsuit, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 24, 2007, at B I.
17 See id.
IS See id.
19 George Lopes, New York Mulls Licenses For Illegals: Spitzer Sees Plan
Exposing Group, Lowering Insurance Rates, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at
C8.
20 Op-Ed., Immigrant Licenses; Spitzer Plan is Good for All NY Drivers,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 25, 2007, at A36.




undocumented.23 Supporters of his plan, such as Richard A.
Clarke, the former White House counterterrorism expert, saw this
result as uniquely advantageous: "it is far preferable for the state to
know who is living in it and driving on its roads... than to have
large numbers of people living in our cities whose identity is
totally unknown to the government."2 4 The plan also included new
technology for scanning and authentication of documents used to
obtain a license in order to strengthen security methods.25 Spitzer
noted that these technologies were successfully used in almost half
the states. 26 The plan was to be implemented in December 2007
when the DMV was to notify 152,000 persons who had licenses
that were not renewable under the Social Security mandate that
they could now reapply. By April 2008, Spitzer intended to open
the program to all applicants.27
B. Support for Spitzer's Plan
The reaction to Spitzer's announcement was immediate and
28intense. For immigrant advocates, Spitzer's plan was a huge
victory. They hailed the driver's license as "a symbol of the hopes
and frustrations of undocumented immigrants." 29 Earlier in the
year, these supporters had failed to pass a broad national bill that30
would have legalized illegal aliens. Spitzer's initiative certainly
was not as grandiose a scheme, but it was a step in the right
direction. By providing immigrants with optimism, they argued
23 Bill Hammond, Editorial, The Way Forward on Licenses, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Oct. 23, 2007, at 29.
24 Sewell Chan & Matthew R. Warren, Former US. Terror Official Backs
Spitzer's License Plan, N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 20, 2007, at B3.
25 See Schuster & Enriquez, supra note 10.
26 Melissa Mansfield, License Plan Hits Bumps; Critics Question Verification
Process but Spitzer's Office Says Technology for Driver's IDs is Sound,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 25, 2007, at A4.
27 Hammond, supra note 23.
28 See Schuster & Enriquez, supra note 10.
29 Dave Marcus, Driver's License Debate Rolls On, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 25,
2007, at A4 1.
30 Dinan, supra note 1.
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that non-citizens, especially those in areas with less readily avail-
able public transportation, would be able to improve their lives.
31
C. Critics of Spitzer's Proposal
Critics, however, raised questions of security and the
increased danger of terrorists being able to commit fraud.32 Easier
access to driver's licenses also meant easier access to voting
registration, pistol permits, bank accounts or universities, which
often accept licenses as valid identification. 33 Families of 9/11
victims cried out against the supposed weakening of security:
"Obviously one 9/11 isn't enough for Spitzer ... People are going
to die.",34 Republican Assemblyman Pete Lopez stated, "[h]anding
licenses out like lollipops to illegal immigrants is an affront to
those who are in our country legally and puts our communities at
risk., 35  Some noted that giving licenses to illegal immigrants
made little sense when the New York DMV had the power to
revoke licenses of those who miss court, fail to pay fines or child
support.36 Why did New York need to make such sweeping
changes instead of just trying to do better job of enforcing current
motor vehicle laws? 37 Others questioned the reliability in preven-
ting fraud of the new technologies that the administration was
planning to implement. 38 Resistance continued with the New York
31 id.
32 Marc Santora and Danny Hakim, Giuliani Criticizes License Plan By Spitzer,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at B2.
33 Tom Precious, Legislature Could Deny Funding for Spitzer's Driver's License
Plan: Governor's Favorable Rating Slides, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 16, 2007, at BF;
Daniel Pye, ERIE COUNTY NOTEBOOK: Licenses for Illegals Having
Electoral Impact, TONAWANDA NEWS (N.Y.), Nov. 1, 2007.
34 Dinan, supra note 1.
35 Id.
36 Tom Precious, Illegals Applying for Licenses Risk Being Arrested; Erie,
Niagara County Clerks Develop Plan to Counter Spitzer's Directive, BUFF.
NEWS, Oct. 25, 2007, at Al.
37 Santora & Hakim, supra note 32.
38 Nicholas Confessore and Danny Hakim, Spitzer's Plan On Licenses For
Immigrants Finds Support, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at B 1.
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State legislature-which had a Democratic led Assembly and a
thin Republican majority in the Senate-who felt Spitzer needed
legislative approval in order to eliminate the Social Security
standard.39 Spitzer's Albany rival, Republican Senate Majority
Leader Joseph Bruno, stated that the plan was "yet another
example of the governor's arrogance and his attempt to go around
the Legislature and bypass 212 elected representatives of the
people."40
D. Concerns Over Federal Licensing Standards
Serious concerns were raised over whether the new license
proposal would meet the new federal security requirements of the
REAL ID Act of 2005.41 Part of an emergency spending bill,
REAL ID repealed a cooperative state-federal process law on
driver's licenses passed in December 2004 and established a
prescriptive federal standard.42 The Act was proposed by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after the 9/11 Com-
mission recommended making identity papers less prone to forgery
in order to prevent terrorism. 43 DHS's REAL ID slogan, "One
driver, one license," conjured up memories of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks.44 At the time Spitzer proposed his new licensing plan in
September 2007, the original drafts of REAL ID required a
standardized state license to have a Social Security Number in
order to board planes or enter federal buildings.45 In addition to
the inclusion of Social Security Numbers, some of the more
extensive REAL ID proposals included: a series of verification
39 Kenneth Lovett, Spitzer Foe: Forget Licenses for Aliens, N.Y. POST, Sept. 29,
2007, at 2.
40 Santora & Hakim, supra note 32.
41 See Schuster & Enriquez, supra note 10.
42 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REAL ID Act of 2005
Driver's License Title Summary I (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/print/stand
comm/sctran/realidsummary05.pdf.
43 See D.R. Stewart, Federal ID Effort Could Affect Airports, Airlines, TULSA
WORLD (Okla.), March 18, 2008.
44 Devlin Barrett, Rules Set for Secure Driver's Licenses: Phase-In of
Requirement Would Begin in 2011, BUFF. NEWS, Jan 11, 2008, at A l.
45 Hammond, supra note 23.
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digit numbers or letters printed on the license, laser engraving
specific to the license-holder, and mandatory in-person re-
licensing/re-credentialing of all drivers.46 Further, REAL ID only
permitted states to have non-complying licenses if those licenses
"have a unique design and a clear statement" clarifying that they
will not be accepted by the federal government as valid identi-
fication.47 These federal requirements, however, were only in the
draft stage and had not been implemented by the DHS. 48 Con-
sequently, Spitzer argued that New York could not wait for the
federal government to take action on an issue that required
immediate attention.49 However, critics within New York recog-
nized that Spitzer's single license plan meant that if REAL ID was
implemented New York citizens would have to show further
documentation to pass federal standards.5 °
Others also had concerns over the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative (WHTI), which was the product of the Intel-
ligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).5' Also
directed by the DHS, WHTI requires federally approved documen-
tation for travelers crossing international borders. 52 On January
23, 2007, as part of WHTI, DHS required all persons traveling by
air to the United States to present valid identity papers, including
passports, Air NEXUS card, or U.S. Coast Guard Merchant
Mariner Document. 53  By the summer of 2008, DHS plans to
implement similar requirements for those traveling across interna-
tional borders by land or sea.54 A possible version for acceptable
identification would be enhanced state licenses, which would only
be available to citizens and would require an imbedded computer
chip, a mark of citizenship, and a specifically-defined Machine
46See Press Release, supra note 2.
47 Mansfield, supra note 26.
48 See Press Release, supra note 2.
49 See Schuster & Enriquez, supra note 10.50See id
51 See U.S. Department of State, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, http:/
travel.state.gov/travel/cbpmc/cbpmc_2223.htmI (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
52 See id.
53 Barrett, supra note 44, at A l.
54 See Press Release, supra note 2.
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Readable Zone. 55 Critics of Spitzer's new license plan argued that
waiting to comply with these federal regulations would benefit
New York since federally compliant, enhanced driver's licenses
could serve as an alternative to expensive passports for New York
State citizens crossing the border into Canada.
56
These criticisms could not easily be brushed aside and
revealed how hard a sell immigration reform would be. Spitzer,
however, was defiant in his response: "[t]he public got what the
public should have anticipated, knowing that I was going to push
very hard, there would be pushback.
57
III. SPITZER'S POLITICAL BATTLES AS
GOVERNOR
Spitzer's aggressive approach to the new driver's license
policy was not unique to his administration as governor. From
1998 to 2006, Spitzer successfully served as New York's Attorney
General and used his image to campaign for governor as the man
who would clean up state politics, which had often been derided
for its corruption and stagnancy. 8 His campaign slogans included
"Day 1: everything changes" 59 and "Bring some passion back to
Albany." 60 Spitzer won in a landslide and when he took office on
January 1, 2007, he had a plan: "[m]y job is to invest, the way
[Alexander] Hamilton did; make sure the rules are enforced, the
way T.R. [Teddy Roosevelt] did; and make sure everyone has a
chance to play by those rules, which is what Al Smith stood for."
6 1
55 See id.
56 See Barrett, supra note 44, at A2
57 Danny Hakim, With Gusto, Spitzer's Back On the Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21, 2007, at A31.
58 See Joseph Spector, Big Day for Dems, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND
CHRONICLE (N.Y.), Nov. 8, 2006, at Al.
59 Jacob Gershman, Spitzer, In a Historic Landslide, Vows 'A New Brand of
Politics,'N.Y. SUN, Nov. 8, 2006, at 1.
60 Hakim, supra note 57.
61 Nick Paumgarten, The Humbling of Eliot Spitzer; The Governor's Rocky
Rookie Season, 83 NEW YORKER 72, Dec. 10, 2007, available at http://www.
newyorker.com, at 3.
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Democrats were elated by Spitzer's victory and hoped his attitude
would help push through more Democratic initiatives, including
health and education systems as well as to help revitalize the
62upstate economy. 2 To bring such change required Spitzer to have
a firm hand and a willingness to fight the entrenched mediocrity of
Albany-something he was more than prepared to do. Yet, while
Spitzer voiced his desire to work with Albany, he approached them
in the aggressive and often contentious manner that had served him
well in his previous role as New York's Attorney General -
evidenced by his infamous self-reference as Albany's "[f**n]
steamroller."
63
A. The Bout with Bruno
Clashes with the NYS legislature took place almost as soon
as Spitzer took office. 64 Spitzer collided with 78 year old Senate
Majority Leader Joseph Bruno when Spitzer broke Albany proto-
col by appointing a Republican Senator to his cabinet and then
campaigning for a Democratic replacement in a special election. 65
This maneuver whittled away at the slim Republican Senate major-
ity and left Bruno with only a two seat majority. 6 6 Republicans
responded by rallying behind Bruno as the legislature, which had
not faced such a test in years, scrambled to redefine its identity.
B. Troopergate
The greatest hit to Spitzer's administration, however, came
with the "Troopergate" scandal (also known as "Choppergate,"
62 See Gershman, supra note 59.
63 Steve Fishman, The Steamroller in the Swamp; Is Eliot Spitzer Changing
Albany? Or is Albany Changing Him?, N.Y. MAG., July 23, 2007, available at
http://nymag.com,.
64 See Hakim, supra note 57.
65 Id.
66 See Nicholas Confessore, As Campaign Season Nears, Spitzer Seeks New
Help and Eyes Republican Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at 3.
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"the Dirty Tricks Scandal," "the Eliot Mess" 67) that erupted in July
2007. The scandal started when some newspapers investigated
Spitzer's possible unlawful use of the state aircraft for fundraising
purposes. While it appeared that Spitzer had not unlawfully used
the aircraft, Darren Dopp, Spitzer's communication director,
decided to extend the search on aircraft usage.69 Claiming that he
expected the media investigation to lead to Freedom of Informa-
tion requests, Dopp looked up the flight records of other state
officials, including Joseph Bruno and lieutenant governor, David
Paterson.70  Dopp, however, did not have complete access to
Bruno's flight records and asked the state police to further investi-
71gate Bruno and establish a retroactive record of his flight usage.
When the police came up with possible evidence of Bruno's
improper use of state aircraft, Dopp provided the information to a
72
newspaper. Two other members of Spitzer's staff were also
involved in this decision. 3
The seeming abuse of the state police led to numerous
investigations of the Spitzer administration by New York State
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, Albany County District
Attorney David Soares, the New York Commission on Public
Integrity, and the New York Senate.74  Cuomo subpoenaed
Spitzer's office, but Spitzer's aides avoided speaking to investi-
gators.75 Dopp was placed on unpaid leave and Spitzer published






73 Rob Hart, D.A. clears Spitzer staff in crusade against rival; 'No illegal
conduct' in compiling data aimed at discrediting Bruno, STATEN ISLAND
ADVANCE (N.Y.), Sept. 21, 2007, at A1
74 See Elizabeth Benjamin, Troubles Build for Eliot, Aide Dopp Faces Perjury
Rap as Diary, Troopergate Testimony Don't Jibe, Daily News (N.Y.), Nov. 12,
2007, at 14 (Cuomo's involvement in the Spitzer investigation was made more
intriguing by the fact that he was tabbed to be Spitzer's rival in the 2010
gubernatorial election.); Paumgarten, supra note 61, at 7.
75 See Jay Gallagher, Spitzer a moving target for questioners, POUGHKEEPSIE J.
(N.Y.), Aug. 19, 2007, at 13A.
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an apology in The New York Times in which he admitted the fault
of his staff but declared himself innocent.7 6 On July 23, 2007,
Cuomo's final report released the Spitzer administration from any
legal liability, but severely criticized them for manipulating the
state police for political reasons. 7 Likewise, in Soares's report
released in September 2007, the Albany DA freed Spitzer and his
administration from any charges of illegal activity.78
Despite the exonerations from Cuomo and Soares, the
Troopergate scandal continued to haunt Spitzer. Dopp testified
during Soares' investigation that Spitzer gave his personal appro-
val to release the information on Bruno-a story that varied widely
with Spitzer's original claim that he had no knowledge of the
situation.79 The scandal, obviously, also did irreparable damage to
Spitzer's relationship with Bruno and the Senate Majority Leader
refused to speak publicly with Spitzer. 80  While attending an
October memorial service for fallen police officers and firefighters,
Bruno showed his disdain for the governor by turning his back to
him.8' Bruno continued to be the subject of an investigation, but,
for the first time, Spitzer had "ceded the moral high ground to
Bruno." 82 Bruno took full advantage of Spitzer's first major slip-
up by relating childhood stories of bullies and essentially cast
Spitzer in the role of a rich, spoiled brat. 83 Part of Spitzer's public
appeal had been his squeaky clean image as the Attorney General
who would clean up the corruption and political nonsense that had
arrested the state's productivity. Tainted with this scandal, it now
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Hart, supra note 73.
79 Kenneth Lovett, 'Eliot Knew' of Dirty Tricks; He Was Alerted Last May: DA
Probe, N.Y. POST, Sept. 22, 2007, at 6.
80 Tom Precious, Spitzer angrily resists demands for testimony, BUFF. NEWS,
Oct. 10, 2007, at A7.
81 Paumgarten, supra note 61, at 2.
82 Dan Janison, SPIN CYCLE: Spitzer's fighting spirit answered, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), July 9, 2007, at A 18.
83 Rick Karlin, Spitzer, Bruno clash part of high-stakes game, TIMES UNION
(N.Y.), July 8, 2007, at B 1.
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appeared that Spitzer was just another disappointing Albany
politician.
C. Loss of Democratic Support
Spitzer's scandal and continued aggressive manner began
to annoy more than his opponents. Democrats had been energized
by his gubernatorial victory, but Spitzer began to squander their
support almost as soon as he took office. 84 In February 2007,
Spitzer voiced harsh criticisms to the constituents of those Demo-
crats responsible for replacing Democratic comptroller Alan
Hevesi-who resigned for improper use of state employees-with
another Democratic Assemblyman, Thomas DiNapoli.85 Spitzer
had wanted to pick a candidate that he felt was qualified rather
than allow the usual favoritism often displayed in Albany.
86
Democratic Assemblyman Jack McEneny observed that "[t]he
temper tantrum that occurred after the DiNapoli affair did almost
irreparable harm to the relationship between the Governor and the
Democrats in the Legislature." 87 Democrats, however, were even
more upset by the revelations made in Troopergate, which tainted
Spitzer's reputation as well as his Democratic party. All this
drama made them further baffled and confused by Spitzer's failure
to consult them or the public on the new licensing issue. 88 Demo-
cratic Assemblyman J. Gray Pretlow stated: "I really don't know
what his strategy is .... There's nothing wrong with standing on
principle, but when you have to come to consensus with other
individuals of various ilks, you have to back down a bit." 89 It
seemed that, despite Spitzer's apology, he had not learned any
lessons from Troopergate and his Democratic supporters were tired
of continually smoothing the wrinkles and feelings shaken up by
Spitzer's defiant attitude.
84 Paumgarten, supra note 6 1, at 6.85 id.
86 id.
87 id.
88 Hakim, supra note 57.
89 id.
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D. The Rebellion of County Clerks
Spitzer's license battle with New York representatives
further continued in the October 2007 rebellion of the county
clerks, most of these from Western New York.90 Many of these
county clerks also handled DMV documents and, despite the fact
that Attorney General Andrew Cuomo stated that Spitzer was
within his legal rights, they believed that Spitzer's directive
ordered them to break the law.91 In defiance of the governor, the
Monroe County legislature ordered its county clerk to require a
Social Security Number for license applications. 92 The clerk from
Rensselaer County, Frank Merola, filed a lawsuit against Spitzer in
Albany County to block the DMV from giving licenses to illegal
aliens.93  Then, twenty-nine clerks statewide (all but one was
Republican) voted to oppose Spitzer's plan with thirteen saying
that they would disobey the governor even if ordered to comply.
94
In total, more than seven counties said that they would not follow
Spitzer's plan.95 In response to clerk rebellion, a spokeswoman for
the governor said that "[i]t would be dangerous for local authorities
to self-deputize themselves as [immigration] agents. It would only
serve to continue to drive people into the shadows, spread fear and
do nothing to improve the safety and security of New Yorkers."
96
The administration further stated that by statute the clerks must
abide by the governor's new rule or they would violate the law.9 7
The county clerks, however, continued to defy the governor's new
licensing plan.
90 Precious, supra note 16.
9' Joe Mahoney, Silver Steers License Plan Past GOP Roadblock, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Oct. 24, 2007, at 16; Precious, supra note 16.
92 Joseph Curl, Illegals OK'd to drive in N. Y.; Governor's nod creates furor,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2007, at Al.
93 Joe Mahoney, Eliot Faces Long Drive After Vote to Ax License Plan, DAILY
NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 23, 2007, at 20.
94 Curl, supra note 92.
95 Precious, supra note 16.
96 Precious, supra note 36
97 Janison, supra note 7.
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In mid-October, Erie County Clerk Kathleen Hochul, a
Democrat who was a year-old Spitzer appointee and who faced
reelection in November 2007, joined forces with Niagara County
Clerk Wayne Jagow, a Republican. 98 Together, they set up a plan
with local and federal law enforcement to notify them of any
illegal immigrants attempting to apply for driver's licenses with
the hope of deterring illegal immigrants from applying for licenses
by making them subject to arrest and deportation." 9 Concern over
possible voter fraud also led Hochul to insist that the New York
legislature pass a law mandating the sharing of data between
county clerks' offices and local election boards. I00 In October, the
state had overturned a policy that Social Security Numbers be
required for voter registration. °1 Without the requirement of a
Social Security number or the sharing of information from the
DMV, Hochul feared that election boards would be vulnerable to
voter fraud since many only require driver's licenses for voting
registration.' 02 Through these expressions of displeasure and
defiance, Hochul and the county clerks added to Spitzer's troubles.
E. Continued Legislative Battles in Albany
The political battle continued in Albany when, on October
22, 2007, the State Senate voted 39-19 (with eight Democrats) to
require immigrants to provide a Social Security Number as proof
of authorized residency. 10 3 During the debates, Republican Sena-
tor John Flanagan criticized the governor for proposing his plan
under "the cloak of darkness . . . without public discourse or
legislative input[.]"' 10 4  He also declared that Spitzer's plan
98 Precious, supra note 36.
99 Id
'0o Precious, supra note 16.
101 ld.
102 Id.
103 Rick Brand and Melissa Mansfield, IMMIGRATION DRIVING DEBATE:
THE POLITICS OF ALBANY; Spitzer, Senate collide head-on; Lawmakers pass
legislation that would block governor's license plan, vow legal action if
assembly fails to vote into law, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 23, 2007, at A7.
104 id.
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undercuts the 317,000 legal immigrants who had legally received
their licenses in the past four years. 1°5 The debate intensified with
accusations of racism and discrimination. 0 6 If the legislation did
not pass the Democratic majority in the New York Assembly-
which it did not-Bruno vowed to take the fight into the courts.10 7
Following the passage of this legislation in the Senate, Spitzer
released the following statement:
Despite many areas of potential agreement, the Senate
today placed pending matters on the back burner to debate
the recent administrative change at the Department of
Motor Vehicles that will bring undocumented immigrants
into the system. While constructive discussion is always
welcome on any issue, my hope is that we can set aside the
demagoguery surrounding the national immigration debate
and pragmatically evaluate this important policy for its
impact on the safety and security of New Yorkers.1
0 8
Spitzer responded to legal threats by stating his belief that he was
well within his power to unilaterally enforce the change in licen-
sing policy. °9 Republican Assembly members, however, contin-
ued to provoke the governor by holding a three-hour emergency
hearing on October 24, 2007.'0 There they criticized Spitzer's
licensing plan, mostly for its perceived security flaws, while
immigrant rights groups, clergy members, and union organizers
protested outside.' 1
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F. Criticism and Spitzer's Reactionary Mindset
As the argument intensified even into the national level, the
rhetoric became harsher as both sides threw verbal barbs. Lou
Dobbs, the host of CNN's "Lou Dobbs Tonight," mercilessly
expressed his disapproval of the license plan and called Spitzer
"arrogant, spineless and 'a spoiled, rich kid brat[.] "'2 But critics
of Spitzer's plan were recipients of equally harsh language from
the governor. Spitzer emphasized that he had every legal right to
make this administrative policy change without the legislature's
consultation and that his opponents were being run by partisan
politics: "The rabid right that wants to pile on and use this to
demagogue the issue will not carry the day in New York state."
' 13
When Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who usually had a cordial
relationship with Spitzer, voiced some concern over the new plan,
Spitzer's reaction was severe: "He is wrong at every level--dead
wrong, factually wrong, legally wrong, morally wrong, ethically
wrong."114 This sort of rhetoric shut down any meaningful dia-
logue between Spitzer and his opponents.
IV. A COMPROMISE: INTRODUCTION OF
MODIFIED THREE-TIERED PLAN
By this point, an October poll showed Spitzer's approval
rating was at an all-time low of 41%. 115 According to another
survey of 718 voters, 65% of New Yorkers were against Spitzer's
proposal including 45% of Democrats and 92% of Republicans."
6
New York was clearly not seeing eye-to-eye with the governor on
112 Associated Press, Spitzer: Help from a friend; Governor says new licensing
plan cooked up in long chats with old chum Chertoff; critics seek changes,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.) Oct. 29, 2007, at A14; Lou Dobbs did eventually apologize for
calling Spitzer an "idiot."
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the license issue. On October 27, 2007, Spitzer seemed to finally
recognize this when he announced a modified three-tiered licen-
sing plan that appeared to address the security concerns raised by
both state and federal authorities." 7 The plan, which had been
structured through talks with the Bush administration and the DHS
in order to comply with REAL ID, offered a federally compliant
license that would only be available to U.S. citizens and legal
immigrants and could be used to board domestic flights and enter
federal buildings."18 The second "enhanced" license would only be
available to U.S. citizens and could be used to cross the Canadian
border in lieu of a passport.1 9  The third license would be
available to all applicants, including illegal immigrants, and would
not mark the holder's immigration status but would not be
considered a valid form of federal identification for boarding
planes or entering federal buildings. 120  By agreeing to comply
with the new federal regulations, New York became one of four
states to follow the drafted regulations of REAL ID.l12
The three-tiered plan drew the praise of several high
officials. Mayor Bloomberg called it "a clear step in the right
direction."' 22  The heads of the state troopers' union and New
York's association of police chiefs voiced support for the plan. 123
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael
Chertoff, appeared with Spitzer to express his approval along with
continued reservations of the modifications made. 2 4  While
Chertoff backed the plan's compliance with federal regulations, he
also stated four times during the conference that he was not happy
117 Associated Press, supra note 112.
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with the continued incorporation of illegal immigrants into the
plan: "I do not endorse and I do not think it's a good idea to give
undocumented workers [driver's] licenses or IDs of any kind."'125
His only support for the plan came from his understanding that it
would now abide by the newest federal security regulations and
help prevent terrorism. 
126
A. New Criticism of the Three-Tiered Plan
The support that Spitzer received from those who had pre-
viously expressed reservations did not prevent critics-some old
and some new-from finding fault in the newest version of New
York's licensing program.127 Republican legislators continued to
express security concerns in giving illegal immigrants licenses.'
28
New York Democrats felt angry and betrayed by Spitzer's
continued failure to consult with them over this more moderate
plan. 129 Democratic Senator Ruben Diaz was livid because he had
strongly supported Spitzer's original plan that allowed illegal
immigrants to apply for regular driver's licenses: "[Spitzer] let me
go on the Senate floor and make a fool of myself. Now I have to
take the time to stand up, eat crap and apologize. Eat my pride."'
130
Democratic Assemblyman Adriano Espaillat characterized this
tiered system as "separate but unequal."' '3 Democrats also lamen-
ted its possible ill effects on the national stage because of its
compliance with President Bush's Real ID regulations.' 32 State
Democratic Senator Eric Schneiderman stated, "He is helping
Chertoff and the Bush administration rescue a failed public policy
that was about to go down to defeat."'' 33 Immigrant advocates who
125 Id.
126 id.
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128 id.
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had wholeheartedly supported his original plan felt betrayed by
Spitzer's change in policy. The New York Immigration Coalition
held a protest outside of Spitzer's office where Chung-Wha Hong,
its executive director, expressed her disapproval of the new plan:
"He's kidding himself if he thinks this will bring people out of the
shadows .... It's a double whammy and a double betrayal.' 34
Clearly, the driver's license plan was becoming more important-
nationally and symbolically-than Spitzer ever intended or
expected.
B. Other State Experiments With a Tiered
License Program
The concept of Spitzer's proposed tiered license program
was not without precedent. Eight other states issue licenses to
illegal immigrants in varying forms. 135 In 2005, Republican-led
Utah created a two-tiered license system that issues regular
driver's license to citizens as well as driver privilege cards for non-
citizens. 136 These privilege cards are clearly marked by a red "P"
to indicate that the cards are not regular driver's licenses.' 3 7 Such
a mark, some in Utah feared, would lead to discrimination and
racial profiling. 138 So far, Utah officials claim that these fears have
been unfounded as 35,000 illegal immigrants are legally driving in
Utah with privilege cards. 139 Recent statistics from Utah also seem
to support Spitzer's contention that allowing undocumented aliens
to register for licenses would increase the number of insured
drivers as well as the safety on roads. 14  According to a study by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the number
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of uninsured Utah drivers dropped from 28% in 2000 to 6% in
2005-06.141 Likewise, the number of deaths per 100,000 drivers
dropped from 25.5 in 2000 to 17.2 in 2005-06.142
Utah's success, however, is not universal. Tennessee
eventually abandoned the same two-tier licensing program, which
Utah had adopted from them, because of corruption and abuses.1
43
DMV workers were caught creating illegal documents while others
would bus illegal immigrants to the DMV for a significant price.
144
North Carolina, who also experimented with a similar tiered
system, stopped issuing licenses because of similar abuses.' 45 In
New Mexico, where Social Security numbers were made an option
in 2003 when applying for licenses, the number of deaths per
100,000 drivers actually increased from 34.9 in 2000 to 37.4 in
2005-06.146
C. Repercussions on the National Level
The fact that other states also experiment with various
reforms for driver's licenses is just one indication that immigration
pervades the national conscience. In making his own plans for
New York reform, Spitzer may have underestimated how Ameri-
ca's love-hate relationship with immigration would affect his
plans. Political analyst, John Pitney, attempted to explain why
immigration remains one of the most volatile topics in the political
arena: "Immigration is about who we are as a people .... [The
issue] will help determine what each party is about. It forces each
side to determine what it is to be an American."' 147 In 2006, there
was much hope that a bipartisan solution could be reached
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concerning immigration issues, particularly on how to deal with
illegal immigrants. A 2006 comprehensive immigration bill, co-
sponsored by Republican Senator John McCain and Democratic
Senator Edward Kennedy, proposed legalization of illegal
immigrants who met the conditions of paying back taxes and
speaking proficient English. 148 Many hoped that this immigration
legislation would pass by the beginning of 2007.149 McCain,
however, "faced a barrage of criticism from conservatives who
oppose his support of the legalization of illegal immigrants."' 150 As
a presidential candidate, McCain withdrew his support for the bill
with the hope of reestablishing his base, but also succeeded in
delaying its further discussion.'
5 1
Continued pressure from conservative bases led to other
responses from Republican leaders. 152 A faction of Republican
Senators, led by Arlen Specter, presented its own bill to compete
with that sponsored by Kennedy.153 It contained many contentious
provisions, including not allowing guest workers the ability to
attain citizenship as well as forcing all illegal immigrants to leave
the country prior to eligibility for residence in the U.S. 54 In
addition, the Republican-led House passed a bill that proposed "to
build 700 miles of new fence along the border."'' 55 These immi-
gration bills failed to pass, but other reforms continue to be intro-
duced. In March 2008, Senate Republicans proposed a fourteen
part immigration package which, among other things, would make
English America's official language and would not allow illegal
148 Op-Ed., Major Immigration Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at 24.
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immigrants to obtain credit cards.' 56 Such provisions continue to
fuel the immigration debate.
D. The License Plan in the Presidential Debates
The intensity of the national immigration scene soon
became perfectly clear during the recent presidential debates for
the 2008 election, particularly among Democrats. While they
continue to debate among themselves, Republican candidates have
it relatively easier when answering immigration questions since
most conservatives favor a harder stance on illegal immigrants.
157
Democrats, however, struggle to find satisfying answers that
navigate the political minefield.158 Nominally, the Democrats have
made immigration reform one of their platforms, but the how and
when to perform such reformation continues to be disputed within
the party. 159 Prior to the primaries in Iowa and New Hampshire,
about three in ten Democratic voters in those states indicated that
they viewed the candidates' stance on immigration as "very
important."' 160  Democrats recognized that their rhetoric must be
moderate enough to satisfy the majority of voters, but also strong
enough to differentiate themselves from the Republicans.' 61 They
feared offending immigrant advocates, especially Latino voters,
who are leaving the Republican ranks and turning towards the
Democrats to offer them a better and more compassionate plan for
immigration reform.' 62 These Latinos make up about nine percent
of the electorate.' 
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The issue of driver's licenses became a means of ferreting
out the presidential candidates' overall positions on immigration
and Spitzer's new plan provided an opportunity to question the
Democratic candidates about their views during the presidential
debates.164 The issue first came up during a debate in Philadelphia
held the night before Halloween on MSNBC. 165  When Tim
Russert asked New York Senator Hillary Clinton to define her
position on Spitzer's new licensing program, she fumbled. At first
she said Spitzer's plan "'makes a lot of sense. What is the gover-
nor supposed to do? He is dealing with a serious problem.""
66
Clinton then stated, however, that she did not feel that the
governor's plan was the best option.' By contrast, Democratic
presidential rivals Barack Obama and John Edwards both clearly
offered their support for giving licenses to undocumented
immigrants. 1
68
The Halloween Eve debate was Clinton's first major
guffaw during the presidential debates and it proved to be a costly
one. 16 9  Her Democratic presidential rivals, Senators Barack
Obama and John Edwards, jumped on her mistake and attempted
to expose her as evasive and dishonest. 170  Performing in a
Saturday Night Live skit that weekend, Obama mocked Clinton's
supposed double-talk by donning a Halloween mask while
declaring, "I have nothing to hide."' 17 1 Edwards told Clinton in
164 George Condon and Finlay Lewis, Opponents Pounce on Clinton's Wavering
Over Driver's Licenses, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 1, 2007,
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Iowa that she should stay in "'tell-the-truth mode all the time."
' 172
The day after the debate, Clinton attempted to control the damage
by releasing a statement to The New York Times, in which she
stated her general support of Spitzer's plan, but still refrained from
commenting on specific details.' 73 She also attempted to draw
attention away from her blunder by characterizing the debate as
"The Politics of Pile-On" on her website. 174 In the subsequent
weeks and presidential debates, Clinton tried to clean up her image
by explaining her position on Spitzer's proposal, but it was clear
that this issue had become a major thorn in her political
campaign. 1
75
V. THE RETREAT AND ITS AFTERMATH
Following these presidential debates, it became clear that
the strain on Spitzer's license plan, from both a local and national
perspective, had become too great. On November 14, 2007, before
another presidential debate on November 15 in Las Vegas, Spitzer
held a press conference in which he officially dropped his driver's
license plan. 176 He noted that while he believed that his policy was
based on the right principles, he no longer thought that New York
was capable of implementing such a change by itself and that only
the federal government would have the ability to succeed in immi-
gration reform. 177 Following the announcement, Clinton released
her own statement in which she stated her support for Spitzer's
withdrawal of the plan and that as president, she would "not
support driver's licenses for undocumented people and will press
for comprehensive immigration reform that deals with all of the
issues around illegal immigration, including border security and
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fixing our broken [immigration] system. ' 178  While the suddenreversal of policy from both the Spitzer and Clinton camps looked
planned, Spitzer insisted that Clinton did not pressure him to pull
the plug for the sake of her campaign. 179 Rather, Spitzer said that
the overwhelming public outcry was the main reason for reversing
his policy. 180
A. Spitzer's Reflection on His Failure
When Spitzer later reflected on his license failure, he
admitted that his aggressive tactics during the early months of hisproposal had left him isolated: "It was a remarkably successful
political maneuver that left me standing in the middle with enemies
on both sides . . . I had a tsunami coming from one ieand a
hurricane coming from the other, and it was not a healthy situation
to be in."' 181 Spitzer also admitted the difference between his role
as Attorney General and as Governor: "[As Attorney General][y]ou are, by and large, the actor who determines pace, timing,
substance, et cetera... In this job, a great deal comes at you, and
so you're thrust into positions where youre reacting. And just the
scale, obviously, makes it more likely that you're going to have
decisions go awry."' 182 Such a statement suggested that Spitzer
was becoming more aware of the greater diplomatic challenge he
faced as a governor.Despite Spitzer's withdrawal of his unpopular licensing
program, a Siena College survey taken from December third
through sixth revealed that only twaen percent of New
Yorkers gave Spitzer a positive rating, down from fifty-seven
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percent approval rating in May.183 Fifty-six percent said they
would not reelect him in 2010 and fifty-two percent favored
Andrew Cuomo as a potential gubernatorial challenger.'
84
Spitzer's bright star had certainly fallen from his successful, almost
uncontested victory as governor. Notwithstanding his defeat,however, Spitzer still remained defiant when Republicans
demanded that the administration recall an estimated 23,000
licenses that were issued to noncitizens without the "temporary
visitor" stamp. 85 The administration refused because it argued
that these stamps were unnecessary for proving lawful status.'
1 86
B. The Division of Immigrant Reformation
Supporters
Perhaps the greatest victims of Spitzer's licensing fiasco
were immigrant advocates. Immigrant leaders who had demanded
immediate reform and had wholeheartedly supported his original
plan felt betrayed by Spitzer's caving in to public demands. 18
7
Their one advocate who appeared willing to take the politicalbruises for their cause had abandoned them. As DemocraticSenator Ruben Diaz said, "The governor failed me; the governor
failed the immigrant community.e 188  To make matters worse,
Spitzer's aggressive and rough manner created more enemies and
skeptics of immigration reform than ever before. Following
Spitzer's announcement, Democratic Assemblyman Adriano
Espaillat stated, "We need to regroup and come up with a new
strategy .... We are very concerned that many of our Democratic
colleagues have thrown immigrants under the bus."'189 Spitzer's
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inability to succeed caused unintended damage, division, and
confusion within the immigration movement that will take a long
time to heal.
C. Possible national immigration reform:
REAL ID
While New York's hope for any immigration reform in the
near future now seems minimal, Spitzer's professed desire that the
federal government achieve a national immigration program seems
closer to becoming a reality. On January 11, 2008, the Department
of Homeland Security announced the final security regulations of
the REAL ID Act of 2005, a law intended to prevent terrorism.'
90
Some of these regulations include requiring both Social Security
Numbers and immigration documents as identification when
applying for federally approved licenses. 191 It also demands the
embedding of filament and holograms into licenses so as to prevent
forgeries.' 92 Those with driver's licenses from states that do not
comply with REAL ID would need further forms of identification
or undergo additional verification to board planes or gain access to
federal buildings. 193 The DHS set a 2011 deadline when they
hoped that all states would be in compliance. 194  The new
regulations apply to all Americans born after December 1, 1964,
and by 2014, all people under fifty years old would be required to
present a REAL ID license to board a plane or enter a federal
building. 195 The fifty year old limit was intended to give the states
more time to comply.' 96 By 2017, even those over fifty will be
expected to have a REAL ID license for federal purposes.97
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Yet, despite the progress made by the Department of
Homeland Security in achieving these reforms, REAL ID is con-
tinuing to face stiff resistance from critics and state govern-
ments. 198 The regulations were ill-received by civil liberties acti-
vists who contend that these policies represent a severe invasion of
privacy because of the personal data that would be shared between
government agencies. 199 Hackers and infiltrators could possibly
access this information. 20 0  Critics also feared that this system
represented a national identity card system and that those who are
not approved would automatically be labeled as suspects for
terrorism. As such, there would be the possibility of more
intrusive identity checks. For state governments, the biggest
problem with the DHS program is the fact that the new REAL ID
regulations and the cost of driver's license applications would
increase despite the fact that the DHS is providing about $360
million to those states that modify their programs.20 2 Their com-
plaints also continued despite the fact that DHS's latest
modifications have reduced the expected cost of state compliance
by seventy-three percent from $14.6 billion to $3.9 billion.20 3
Legislatures from seventeen states have passed resolutions that
challenge REAL ID.2°4 As Spitzer had recognized when he began
his New York initiative, a federal program would be ideal, but it
would also be nearly impossible to achieve a national program that
would be universally accepted by all states and implemented
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VI. CONCLUSION
When Spitzer introduced his driver's license plan in
September 2007, he threw down a gauntlet that proved more of a
challenge than even he could handle. Following through on a cam-
paign promise to open up the doors for undocumented immigrants,
Spitzer either naively or recklessly believed that unilateral use of
his executive authority would solve the highly charged issue of
immigration. By announcing the implementation of this plan with-
out consulting the legislature or engaging in discourse with the
New York State public, Spitzer looked arrogant. When he refused
to dialogue with those who dared criticize or question the program,
he looked almost dictatorial. His aggressive and often hostile
approach left little room for any reasonable, level-headed dis-
cussion of the merits of the program. His attitude had an isolating
effect that seemed to suggest that it would be his way or nothing.
The resulting reaction was too intense to be patched through small
policy changes. Both sides of the New York legislature were left
in confusion and with bruised egos. When New York's own
Senator and presidential hopeful, Hillary Clinton, became tainted
by her response to Spitzer's policy, the administration realized it
was time to pull the plug on the ill-fated program.
Spitzer maintained that his license failure was not a huge
defeat but it has left immigrant advocates bitterly disappointed.
His plan to grant licenses to illegal immigrants showed a com-
passionate sensitivity to the undocumented "shadows" of New
York, but the opportunity to promote the program in this light was
lost to the public primarily because of Spitzer's contentious, in-
your-face attitude. Not only did Spitzer succeed in angering his
opposition but also those advocates who believed that Spitzer
would follow through on his original promises. When Spitzer
finally dropped the plan, his critics triumphed while the advocates
for immigration reform were left deeply disappointed. Nothing
had been achieved but more division, more anger, and more
distrust. Some of Spitzer's rhetoric in the weeks following the
defeat of his plan reveals a regret at failing to gain more political
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allies in his quest for immigration reform. 20 5 It is too late to tell
how much acceptance Spitzer would have achieved in New York
for his licensing program if he had presented it in a manner that
took into account the criticisms and concerns of his opponents and
supporters. Now, with his recent resignation on March 17, 2008
following his shocking sex scandal, it will be left to Spitzer's
successors to decide if they will test the immigration waters
again.20 6 One thing remains certain; however, the volatile nature
of immigration on both the national and state levels ensures that
future reform will continue to face an uphill battle within the
coming years.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: On March 17, 2008, Eliot Spitzer was forced to resign as
New York's governor following his sex scandal and possible illicit use of
government money. This article was written and edited just before Spitzer's
resignation. Although Eliot Spitzer is no longer in office, the issues raised by
his attempt to provide driver's licenses to all immigrants are still important. The
fate of many of Spitzer's initiatives is uncertain and the question of whether
immigration reform will be raised in the near future will have to be determined
by Spitzer's successors.
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